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that they fulfil every duty by prayers and ceremony. Lastly, to quote the most extraordinary error of all, the idea of attributing to El Islam an "eudæmonistic colouring" is diametrically opposed to fact. Mohammed strove stoutly against asceticism, the bane of oriental systems, but he strove in vain: the characteristic of El Islam is a peculiar gloom.

With respect to the orthography of proper names, I find that both the author and the translator have preserved the forms used by the authorities from whom they borrow; and, indeed, to have done otherwise would have caused a great increase of labour without proportionate advantage. We find, therefore, such forms as Kaffirs (p. 45, for Kafirs or Caffres), Tudas (p. 45, for Todas), Yarriba (p. 60, for Yoruba), Barabra (p. 60, for Barabara), Tschego (p. 91, for Nchigo), Papaws (p. 100, for Popos), Cunka (p. 105, for Cankey or Kankei), St. Thomas and Annabon (p. 133, for San Thomè and Annobom), Camanchses and Riccarees (p. 141, for Komanches and Arikaris), Yebus (p. 242, for Jebus or Ijebus), Sowaheili (p. 254, for Sowahili), Apollonia (p. 299, for Appolonia).

On the other hand, I think it to be regretted that the excellent translator should have preserved such palpable Germanisms as Jemen (p. 48, for Yemen), Maniok (p. 59, for Manioc), Schoschonies (p. 62, for Shoshonis), Adamaua (p. 209, for Adamawa), Vindjha (p. 252, for Vindya), Schamanism (p. 303, for Shamanism), and Cawries (p. 367, for Cowries). Amongst the errors and misprints must be reckoned Botokudes (p. 55) and Botocudes (p. 215) for Botucudos, the word being derived from *botuque*, Port. a bung; Dentrecasteaux (p. 295, for D'Entrecasteaux) and De Barras (p. 326, for De Barros). Finally, in p. 257, "twirling" should be substituted for whirling, and, in p. 335, bison for buffalo.

BAIN ON THE SENSES AND THE INTELLECT.*

ONE portion of Professor Bain's great work on the human mind has, after an interval of nine years, reached a second edition. We are in doubt whether we ought to congratulate him on the fact, or condole with him on the delay. But, all things considered, we believe we may congratulate him, and we do so most sincerely. It seems hard, at first sight, that the second edition of a sensation novel should spring up, like a mushroom, in a night, while the second edition of a philosophical work requires nine years for its development. But the author of the philosophical work may console himself with the reflection that his reputation will endure, when that of his rival is dead and buried. The elephant sees out many generations of mushrooms; and Professor Bain's reputation will survive that of many sensation novelists.

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* The Senses and the Intellect. By Alexander Bain, M.A. Second Edition. London: Longman and Co.

The fact that Professor Bain's work has reached a second edition tells not a little in favour of the pursuits of the present generation. The *Senses and the Intellect* is not unnecessarily technical, but it is not a *dilettante's* book. The man who works steadily through it performs a task of some severity—of such severity that, unless the work were congenial, he would not perform it at all. But let it not be supposed that in saying this we wish to detract either from Professor Bain's matter or from his style; we believe, on the contrary, that the work is made as attractive to the general public as such a systematic treatise on this subject can be made. The news that the first edition has been absorbed we think we must regard as very good news for the psychologist and the anthropologist.

The differences between the first and the second edition are, as Professor Bain says in his preface, not very material; we shall have a word or two to say upon them presently, but before doing so we will sketch out the general plan of the work.

After giving his definition and division of mind, Professor Bain begins with a chapter on the nervous system and its functions. The experiments of Flourens are cited to prove the different offices of different parts of the encephalon, and especially of the cerebellum. Although the objections of Brown-Séquard to the conclusions of Flourens are quoted, they do not appear to have shaken Professor Bain's confidence in the theory that the cerebellum harmonises the locomotive movements. Indeed, we should have liked this chapter better had the author spoken with greater diffidence of the present state of cerebral physiology. In the first volume of the *Anthropological Review* (p. 337), numerous apparently contradictory facts and experiments, as well as contradictory theories of different physiologists are brought into juxtaposition. It is impossible to read that article without coming to the conclusion that there is indeed some connexion between the encephalon and mental phenomena, but that it is at present impossible to state definitely what is the nature of that connexion. Professor Bain argues that the brain is the principal organ of mind; yet, in a footnote, he gives us the experiment performed by Pflüger, which we quote: "A beheaded frog, whose hind foot is touched with an acid, makes efforts with the other hind foot to wipe away the acid. If a drop is placed on the back on one side, the animal uses the leg on that side to relieve itself of the sting; and, farther, if by cutting the nerve that leg is rendered powerless, the other leg is stimulated to remove the acid. These actions have the character of the voluntary actions; and yet they proceed from no higher a centre than the spinal cord." Professor Bain's remarks on the difficulty which arises here are not very satisfactory. "We have," he confesses, "no means of adequately explaining such a phenomenon. Possibly, in animals of a low order, the processes of will and intelligence are not so exclusively centralised in the brain as in the higher vertebrata." Possibly so; but the results of different experiments are so contradictory, that we think the only course an unprejudiced man can at present take is to suspend his judgment.

After instituting a comparison between nervous force and electricity, Professor Bain says, "The current character of the nerve force leads to a considerable departure from the ancient mode of viewing the position of the brain as the organ of mind. We have seen that the cerebrum is a mixed mass of grey and white matter—the matter of centres and the matter of conduction. Both are required in any act of the brain known to us. The smallest cerebral operation includes the transmission of an influence from one centre to another centre, from a centre to an extremity, or the reverse. Hence, we cannot separate the centres from their communicating branches; and, if so, we cannot separate the centres from the other organs of the body that originate or receive the nerve stimulation. The organ of mind is not the brain by itself; it is the brain, nerves, muscles, organs of sense, and viscera. When the brain is in action there is some transmission of nerve power, and the organ that receives or that originated the power is an essential part of the circle of mechanism.

"The notion that the brain is a sensorium, or inner chamber where impressions are accumulated, like pictures put away in a store, requires to be modified and corrected......Whether, under a sensation of something actual, or under an emotion, or an idea, or a train of ideas, the general operation is still the same. It seems as if we might say, no currents no mind. The transmission of influence along the nerve fibres from place to place seems the very essence of cerebral action. This transmission, moreover, must not be confined within the limits of the brain; not only could no movements be kept up, and no sensation received by the brain alone, but it is uncertain how far even thought, reminiscence, or the emotions of the past and absent could be sustained without the more distant communications between the brain and the rest of the body—the organs of sense and of movement."

This theory is ingenious, and would be strictly in accordance with Hartley's theory of vibrations, of which Professor Bain's work constantly reminds us; but there is an objection to the theory, so far as memory is concerned, which seems to us unanswerable. The warrior who has lost his limbs in battle can in memory fight his good fights over again, and suffer pangs in the tissues that lie beneath the sod. The current in this case certainly stops short of the apparent seat of the revived sensation; and if in this case, why not in all? But, though we cannot shut our eyes to this difficulty, we must not forget that the "current" theory is in perfect harmony with modern scientific views of Force. The objections to the sensorium theory are perhaps equally great, especially when we take into consideration Pflüger's experiments with the frog; and so, again, we have forced upon us the conclusion that, on this subject, we know nothing. At present, the only way of arriving at a state of certainty on these subjects seems to be the adoption of Dr. Ludwig Büchner's* method. He generally deals with a theory antagonistic to his own in this manner: "There is not sufficient evidence to establish this theory to my satisfaction; the absence of sufficient evidence to establish a theory is equivalent to the presence of sufficient evidence to disprove it; therefore, this theory is wrong, and mine is right." Fortlage, it seems, has had the misfortune to differ from Dr. Büchner, and has considered it an error to place the seat of the soul in the brain. "If Fortlage," says Dr. Büchner, "had taken the trouble of reading, merely superficially, any manual of physiology, he would have kept this remark to himself." Perhaps, if Dr. Büchner had weighed the evidence on all sides of the question, his work would have lost much of its dogmatism, and not a little of its brilliancy.

To return, however, from the cock-sure to the pains-taking school of psychology. Professor Bain next proceeds to consider the muscular system, and what he calls spontaneous activity. As this theory of spontaneous activity is made a prominent feature in his system, we must endeavour to explain what it is, and upon what basis the author conceives it to rest. The theory is that muscular movement is antecedent to stimulus and to sensation; that it is the result of a spontaneous flow of energy from nerve-centres; and this theory the author believes to be a necessary part of a satisfactory theory of volition. The proofs are thus recapitulated in Professor Bain's work on *The Emotions and the Will*:—

"The physiological fact of a central discharge of nervous energy where no stimulus from without is present as a cause; the activity of the involuntary muscles displayed in the maintenance of the respiration, the circulation of the blood, etc.; the circumstances of awakening from sleep, wherein movement as a general rule appears to precede sensation; the early movements of infancy, and the activity of young animals in general; the activity of excitement; the occurrence of temperaments of great activity with comparatively low sensibility."

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* Kraft und Stoff.

We do not think these arguments are sufficient to prove that the activity is antecedent to stimulation, though they certainly are sufficient to prove that the amount of activity called forth by any given stimulant differs with the condition of the centre upon which it acts. To prove absolute spontaneity, it would be necessary to bring in evidence a discharge of force from a centre to which no stimulus could in any way have been conveyed; and this condition it seems to us impossible to fulfil. The stimulus of pressure acts even upon the *fœtus in utero;* and, when once any single centre has been acted upon, it is impossible to be certain that it may not, in its turn, act upon other centres. Far as we may carry back our inquiry, we cannot eliminate the possibility of stimulation, and can therefore never demonstrate spontaneity. We will say a word upon each of the arguments, beginning with the last, to which there are two objections. In the first place, if admitted, the argument will only prove what we have already allowed, that the result of stimulation varies with the condition of the centre stimulated; in the second place, the question of stimulation is distinct from the question of sensation: the activity of the "active man" may be, and probably is, somewhat automatic in its character; he acts because he has acted, and because, as Mr. Herbert Spencer would say, his parents have acted; he has inherited, as physicians would say, the temperament, as Mr. Herbert Spencer would say, the experience, or to speak perhaps more accurately, the associations of his ancestors. In other words, the relation of his centres to the conducting nerves and the external world is such that he is an active man; but, in looking to the centres, we must not forget the relation.

Coming now to the argument from the activity of young animals, we cannot admit that the "freshness" of the centres is the sole cause; nor is it even necessary to assume that the freshness of the centres is the principal cause. It must be recollected that in youth the stimuli are new, and at all periods of life a new stimulus has a most powerful effect, whether it be a new emotion, a new study, a change of scene, or a change of air. That the nervous centres partake of the vitality which pervades the whole system in youth there can be no doubt; but that the slowness and inactivity of age result merely from exhaustion of the nervous centres, and not from loss of novelty in the stimuli, nor from the induration of the tissues in general, we can see no evidence whatever. Nor, again, are we by any means sure that when we awaken from sleep, movement even *appears* to precede sensation. Persons who are least in the habit of dreaming dream, when they dream at all, just before waking. In other words, sensation is revived before those movements which precede the act of getting out of bed. And even were this not the case, we could not be certain that such movements are strictly spontaneous. The mere necessity that we are under of lying long in one position may produce a state of limbs which may act as a stimulus. If we stand too long with the weight of the body on one leg, and then change to the other, the act is surely not independent of stimulation; nor do we believe that the act of stretching the limbs in bed is independent of a similar stimulation. To take now the argument from the involuntary muscles, not even Professor Bain himself professes to believe that the spontaneity of their movements is proved. Speaking of the first movements of the heart and lungs, he now says, in a note, "I do not wish to foreclose this question, or to deny that external stimulants may come into play to produce the effect." And, in another note, he very considerably modifies his first argument from the tonicity of muscle, which he now admits may result from a *constant* stimulation, though he regards a constant stimulation as equivalent to no stimulation at all. But if Professor Bain does not wish to foreclose the question, neither do we; the question seems to us as difficult as to ascertain the first origin of motion in the heavenly bodies, or the origin of matter itself. The problem seems to be this: given two bodies acting on one another; which first began to act on the other? An analogous question would be—given a circular line, where does it begin?

Whichever way this delicate question may be settled (if, indeed, it can be settled at all), we do not think Professor Bain's work will lose much of its value, for that value consists, all theory apart, mainly in the description and classification of mental phenomena; and both description and classification are admirable. It is impossible, in a few pages, to convey any idea of the elaborate care with which all the details are worked out, both in the work we are now considering, and in *The Emotions and the Will.* There is a constant reference to the anatomy of the organs of sense—a constant endeavour to ascertain how we arrive at our ideas of the external world. To give a meagre outline of a picture whose chief beauty is the richness of its details would be unfair. We must leave the description for our readers to study at their leisure. The classification is so simple, that we hope to succeed in explaining it. First in order come the feelings of muscular movement, as a class distinct from the five commonly recognised senses, and through these feelings, together with those of touch, says Professor Bain, we arrive at our ideas of space. The muscles of the eyes are, of course, not to be forgotten. Next to the muscular feelings come the "sensations of organic life," which Professor Bain also classes apart from the five senses. These sensations are the organic muscular feelings, *e. g.*, injuries, cramps, etc.; the organic sensations of nerve; the organic feelings of the circulatton and nutrition, *e. g.*, thirst, starvation, etc.; the feelings of respiration; the feelings of heat and cold; and the feelings of electrical states.

Then come the five senses, in the following order: taste, smell, touch, hearing, sight; and there is a reason for the order in which they are taken. Those which contribute least to the permanent forms and imagery employed in our intellectual processes are considered first; those which contribute most, last.

The appetites are next dealt with; under which head are classed sleep, exercise and repose, thirst and hunger, the appetite of the sexes, and "the accustomed routine of life," *i. e.*, the desire which recurs every day to do our daily labour, whatever it may be.

After the appetites, Professor Bain treats of the instincts. "*Instinct*," he says, "is defined by being opposed to acquisition, education, or experience. We might express it as the *untaught* ability to perform actions of all kinds, and more especially such as are necessary or useful to the animal." We quote this definition, because a good definition of instinct is a desideratum; and this is very good as far as it goes. We are, however, somewhat surprised to find no mention made here of Mr. Herbert Spencer's theory that there is such a thing as inherited experience. If that theory were adopted, instinct would have to be opposed, not necessarily to experience in general, but to the experience of the individual. Though there are objections to the use of the term "inherited experience," there seems no reason to doubt that Mr. Herbert Spencer is on the right track when he connects the actions of the present generation with the experience of the past. Professor Bain, who has evidently studied Mr. Herbert Spencer with care, would hardly have passed over this theory, had it not been apparently irreconcileable with his own theory of spontaneous activity. It is obvious that, assuming hereditary experience to be a fact, it would be necessary to travel back *ad infinitum* before we could arrive at spontaneity.

We come now to that portion of the work which deals with the intellect, perhaps the most satisfactory portion. Professor Bain now starts by enunciating more clearly than in his first edition the great fundamental "Law of Relativity." By this is meant that, as change of impression is an indispensable condition of being conscious, or of being mentally alive either to feeling or to thought, every mental experience is necessarily twofold. We can neither feel nor know heat except in the transition from cold. In every feeling there are two contrasting states; in every act of knowing two things are known together. In addition to this faculty of discrimination, the mind has the power of retaining and recovering past impressions, which power is exemplified under the head of the "Law of Contiguity." The remaining property of the intellect is consciousness of agreement; and this property is treated of under the head of the "Law of Similarity."

The Law of Contiguity, called by Sir William Hamilton the Law of Redintegration, is thus stated by Professor Bain. "Actions, Sensations, and States of Feeling, occurring together or in close succession, tend to grow together, or cohere, in such a way that, when any one of them is afterwards presented to the mind, the others are apt to be brought up in idea." This law is followed out in all its details, and in its application to all mental phenomena, with an elaboration and with a richness of illustration, of which we cannot here give any idea. We can only quote another sentence by way of example. "Contiguity joins together things that occur together, or that are by any circumstance presented to the mind at *the same time*, as when we associate heat with light, a falling body with a concussion."

The Law of Similarity is thus stated: "*Present* Actions, Sensations, Thoughts or Emotions, tend to revive their LIKE among previous Impressions or States."

> "Some preliminary explanation of the kind of relation subsisting between the two principles of Contiguity and Similarity, is requisite in order to guard against mistakes, and especially to prevent misapprehension as to the separate existence of the two modes of action in the mental framework. When the cohesive link between any two contiguous actions or images is confirmed by a new occurrence or repetition, it is obvious that the present impression must revive the sum total of the past impressions, or reinstate the whole mental condition left on the occasion immediately preceding. Thus, if I am disciplining myself in the act of drawing a round figure with my hand, any one present effort must recall the state of the muscular and nervous action, or the precise bent acquired at the end of the previous effort, while that effort had to reinstate the condition at the end of the one preceding, and so on. It is only in this way that repetition can be of any avail in confirming a physical habit or in forming an intellectual aggregate. But this re-instatement of a former condition by a present act of the same kind is really and truly a case of the operation of the associating principle of similarity, or of like recalling like; and we here plainly see that without such recall the adhesion of contiguous things would be impossible."

In short, when dealing with Contiguity, we must consider it as the *variable* element, while Similarity is the *constant;* in dealing with Similarity we must regard it, in its turn, as the *variable* element, and Contiguity as the *constant.*

The Law of Contiguity has been well worked in different psychological treatises from the time of Aristotle downwards, and especially by Hartley. Mr. Lewis, it is true, denies Aristotle the merit of having discovered the Law *as a law*, and says we read our modern ideas *into* his writings. But it is certain that Aristotle did enunciate the Law almost as distinctly as Professor Bain. He saw the *tendency* of a state of consciousness co-existing with or succeeding another state of consciousness to cohere in future with the associated state of consciousness; and we have even now arrived at no more. Mr. Herbert Spencer has made an attempt to carry the law farther, and to ascertain why, when a state of consciousness has been at different times associated with several other different states of consciousness, it coheres with one of them rather than with another; but he does not pretend that he could predict, under any given circumstances, what state of consciousness or states of consciousness, would be revived in association with any other given state of consciousness. He compares this problem with the astronomical "problem of three bodies." But to Professor Bain alone belongs, if we are not mistaken, the honour of having carefully worked out the Law of Similarity. It has been glanced at before; it was insisted on by Sir William Hamilton; but, so far as we are aware, it has never been treated in detail until now. And the law is undoubtedly of very great importance in many ways, but especially inasmuch as it enables us to class under one head the mental operations commonly called Generalisation, Abstraction, Induction, and Deduction. Such terms are convenient enough at times, but the Science of Psychology is terribly subject to the disease of word-worship, and all kinds of improper uses have been made of words originally intended to serve no other purpose than that of a convenient division.

Another use made of these two Laws of Contiguity and Similarity, both in the present work and in Professor Bain's Essay on Character, is the classification of different types of mind. For instance, the Naturalist is strong in the element of Contiguity; the man who discovers the laws of Nature is strong in the element of Similarity; the former observes and remembers, the latter identifies, classifies, and generalises. Of course a man may be strong in both elements, and may both remember and classify, as Linnæus did.

There is yet another element in our mental constitution which Professor Bain treats of under the head of "Constructive Association." He says, "By means of Association, the mind has the power to form combinations, or aggregates different from any that have been presented to it in the course of experience." This power is of course conspicuous in the poet, painter, engineer, etc.; but we must take leave to object that this law, if law it can be called, is somewhat opposed, if not in direct contradiction, to the Law of Contiguity. For instance, a poet imagines a centaur. Of course he never saw a centaur; but he has seen a man and he has seen a horse. In this case the Law of Contiguity seems to act from the head of the man downwards until his body joins the body of the horse; it seems also to act from the tail of the horse forwards until the body of the horse joins that of the man. But at the line of junction the law seems to be completely reversed. Nor will the Law of Similarity help us out of the difficulty. There certainly seems to be here a new element, distinct from the laws of association, properly so called. How to deal with it and reduce it to law seems to us a very difficult question. By the law of contiguity the mind has associations given it from what is commonly called the external world. By the constructive faculty it creates associations for itself. In the one case it depends upon experience both for the materials and for their arrangement; in the other case it depends upon experience for the materials, but apparently not for the arrangement.

It will be seen that throughout the whole work Professor Bain assumes, what has sometimes been denied, that the subjective method of examination may produce good fruits. By the subjective method we mean here what M. Auguste Comte and Mr. Buckle meant by the term, the method of examining our individual consciousness. Mr. Lewes, in his "Aristotle", has recently used the term in another sense—as a synonym for the method which dispenses with induction, for the method which reasons from premisses that have not been previously verified. That any scientific results can come from the subjective method in this latter sense of the term is obviously impossible; but that good results may come and have come from introspection, we firmly believe, as do Professor Bain and Mr. Herbert Spencer.

The objection of the Positivists that the instrument which performs the operation is identical with the thing examined, appears to us to be invalid. It starts by assuming two propositions, of which one is certainly false and the other has never been proved to be true. It assumes, first, that there is a permanent immutable *ego*, which no one has yet succeeded in demonstrating; and it assumes, secondly, that this *ego*, when contemplating itself, always contemplates itself as it exists at the moment, whereas in fact it will be found that in every act of so-called introspection, it is the past which is considered and not the present; and our own past states of consciousness are surely as legitimate objects of scientific consideration as any other past facts which we may happen to remember. It may certainly be argued that memory is more treacherous than direct observation. But, if so, it may be answered that we can confirm our own past experience by experiments on other individuals. We may interpret, and we do interpret their words and actions by reference to our own past states of consciousness.

There is one very curious addition to Professor Bain's definition of mind, which we do not consider by any means an ornament to the second edition of his work. We are obliged to bring it in abruptly and *àpropos de rien,* because it has really no connexion whatever with any part of his system.

> "Mind," he says, in the first page, "is commonly opposed to Matter, but more correctly to the external world. These two opposites define each other. To know one is to know both. The external or object world is distinguished by the property called extension, which pertains both to resisting matter, and to unresisting, or empty space. The internal, or the subject world, is our experience of everything not extended; it is neither matter nor space. A tree, which possesses extension, is a part of the object world; a pleasure, a volition, a thought, are facts of the subject world, or of mind."

The object of this definition is "to comprehend in a few words, by some apt generalisation, the whole kindred of mental facts, and to exclude everything of foreign character." But we submit that the object is not attained by raking up this old distinction, which is almost, if not quite, meaningless. Any relation between any two bodies is as truly unextended as mind is. A line one inch long is to a line five inches long as one to five; a line five inches long is to a line twenty-five inches long as one to five also; but who can say that the relation between either pair of lines is of any given length—that it is extended. And so, according to the definition, any given object is a part of the external world; any of its relations to other objects is part of the internal, or subject, world. We must confess ourselves unable to see that the relation between any two objects is a part of the subject world if we assume that the objects themselves are not a part of that subject world. The perception of the relation is a part of the subject world certainly, but then so is the perception of the two objects themselves. It seems to us that the distinction is about as useful to the psychologist as the distinction between vegetable forms and non-vegetable relations would be to the botanist. "Vegetables," he might say, "inhale carbonic acid and exhale oxygen, but botany does neither the one nor the other; the relation between a vegetable and a vegetable is not itself a vegetable, and so at one *coup* we have separated vegetables and the science which treats of them." Sheer nonsense all this of course, but no more nonsense than the distinction of the object-world and the subject world by the terms extended and unextended.

We were for a long time puzzled to conjecture why Professor Bain, who says elsewhere, "no currents no mind," should disfigure the first page in his book with such a curious piece of patch-work as this. There are some passages which lead us to believe that Prof. Bain has a very strong sense of humour, and we suspect that this little vagary is intended as a quiet joke; if so, it is certainly an excellent joke. Professor Bain is probably as well acquainted as any one with the words Horace uses when ridiculing an unequal work of art,

> "Purpureus, late qui splendeat, unus et alter
> Assuitur pannus."

which might be freely translated, "Professor Bain has tacked on a theological patch or so to cover a multitude of scientific sins," *i. e.* sins regarded from a certain theological point of view. The humour lies in the cool audacity of assuming that one page, to which attention is called in the preface, will cover the nakedness of 639 other pages. The proportion is really not that of a fig-leaf to the human form. But Professor Bain has perhaps met men as easily satisfied as the vice-principal of a college at Oxford, who, when informing a pupil that he was to be presented with books of a certain value to be chosen by the pupil himself, said, "Now choose whatever you like; no restriction whatever; but be sure you get good bindings; no half calf, you know, whole calf, mind, whole calf, whole calf."*

Whether it be worth while to conciliate the small fry of uneasy theologians at this price we very much doubt. It must be always borne in mind that the earnest believer has no fear of the truth, and is on the side of the man of science. He is persuaded that he has the true religion, and that truth can never hurt it; and he knows that if men of science take the wrong path for a time, they will ultimately find out their mistake and turn back again. Had men of such a stamp been in certain high quarters, we should not recently have witnessed the most ludicrous of all spectacles—Infallibility afraid of facts, and scenting Schism in the very name of Science.† A true believer no more thinks it necessary to bolster up his faith at every turn, than a true gentleman thinks it necessary to tell everybody he meets that he is a gentleman. If, then, religion has an enemy in these days, that enemy is not the conscientious man of science, but the fidgety theologian.

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* Fact within our knowledge.

† The *Home and Foreign Review*, an ably conducted publication, which treated scientific subjects from a Roman Catholic point of view, recently received a hint to commit suicide, and committed it accordingly.

But to return to Professor Bain. We have to express our regret that we have found it necessary to differ from him on some points; and we regret it the more, because controversy takes up very much space, and assent very little. But, in the main, we consider the three works, *The Senses and the Intellect*, *The Emotions and the Will*, and *The Study of Character*, to be a most valuable contribution to the Science of Mind, perhaps the most valuable that has yet appeared. Differences of opinion there always must be in every science that has not become exact. But there is one point in which, above all others, we agree with him, and that is, in his estimate of the value of that *haute école* of mental gymnastics, Mental Science. Like all other sciences, it gratifies, perhaps we ought at present rather to say excites, our natural curiosity; it serves to explain differences in the intellectual character of different individuals; and, above all, it is only through it that we can arrive at a rational system of education.

THE GIPSIES IN EGYPT.*

BY ALFRED VON KREMER.

EXCEPTING the Jews there is no people so scattered over the earth as the gipsies. Homeless and yet everywhere at home, they have preserved their physiognomy, manners, and language. Everywhere they support themselves as tinkers, musicians, fortune-tellers, and everywhere have they but loose notions concerning the rights of property. Whilst in Europe it is only in Hungary and Spain where the gipsies still exhibit all their peculiarities, inasmuch as elsewhere they present the varnish of civilisation; Egypt is the classical soil of the East, which shows them in their primitive form.

The Turks and the Persians denominate this remnant of a people *thingāneh*, a term expressing the greatest contempt. It is, however, remarkable, that in Arab-countries this designation is altogether unknown. There are a great number of gipsies in Syria, where they are known by the Arabic name, *Nuwar*, and are looked upon as an Arab tribe of the Beni-Nuwar. In Egypt they are called *Ghagar*. The name Nuwār is also understood in Egypt; but in Upper Egypt

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* Translated from "Ægypten; Forschungen über Land und Volk während eines Zehnjährigen Aufenthalts, von Alfred von Kremer, Leipzig, 1863." Egypt; Exploration of the Country, and Studies of its Inhabitants, during a Ten Years' Residence.